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The Opportunity Funding Corporation's primary novelty is that it is the first
attempt to determine experimentally how to build a capital base in low-income
communities. It attempts, in effect, to transfer the experience and learning of the
banker, the securities analyst, and all the other financial specialists who help to create
the money markets and the investment opportunities that leverage the use of capital
in this country. It is thus an attempt to experiment in the transfer of financial tech-
nology from the affluent, capital-rich economy of Wall Street to the poor, capital-
starved economy of the urban and rural ghettos and barrios. It may, of course, be
inappropriate to suppose that the financial technology common in the non-minority
community can or should be transferred to the minority community.
The Opportunity Funding Corporation (OFC) was born in controversy, and it
has been initiated in spite of substantial protest by the very groups it seeks to serve.
Officially, OFC is an experimental economic development effort designed to test
and demonstrate the effectiveness of various incentive, guarantee, and rediscount
techniques in attracting private capital to low-income areas. Unofficially, the new
program has been labeled by some community leaders as a white-run boondoggle-
just a new way of taking money away from the poor and giving it to non-minority
capitalists.1 Reverend Douglas Moore of Washington's Black United Front has
called OFC "an example of OEO money wasted on a white-run 'phony outfit."' 2
There is a requirement that the local Community Action Program (CAP) agency
must approve OEO anti-poverty grants in the Washington area. The Washington
anti-poverty agency, the United Planning Organization (UPO), which was the
agency responsible for approving the initial OFC grant, refused to do so. The
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'See Rosenthal, Investment Test is Slated by ORO, N.Y. T'imes, Mar. 22, 1970, § I, at 53, col. 3;
OpIcE oF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, FACT SHEET ON THE OPPORTUNITY FUNDING COR ORATION: DEscRIP-
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reason given by UPO officials was that the project was "unworkable, would cost too
much money, and might compete here in Washington with UPO itself."'
Rev. Moore and other community leaders complained of the vagueness of the
proposal to OEO.4 Nationally, a fairly broad spectrum of community leaders have
also expressed the feeling that OFC was set up in secrecy and without any real
input from the very community groups it was intended to serve. On the other
hand, Eli Goldston, a member of the OFC Board of Directors, and former OEO
Administrator Donald Rumsfeld felt the proposal for funding had to be worded
vaguely in order to give the experimental program the necessary freedom in
planning and operation.5 Mr. Rumsfeld also felt that there was some urgency in
launching the OFC project and that inputs from the various community groups
would be useful in shaping OFC programs after the project was in operation.
Why so much protest against an organization that on paper sounds like a cross
between a Harley Street banking house and a Hartford-based insurance company?
Why have community leaders been so vociferous in their opposition to the OFC
concept and to OEO's efforts to establish it? Why have many financial and business
leaders been so enthusiastic in their response?
The answers to the questions of why the protest and why the enthusiasm are
not hard to find. The protest arose from the way the OFC concept was formulated
and established as an operating entity. The enthusiasm was the result of the OFC
philosophy of minority economic development which is largely a "business" approach
to such development. To understand both the protest and the enthusiasm it is
necessary to examine the brief history of OFC and its creator's philosophy of minority
development.
I
HISTORY
A. The Formative Concepts
OFC officially became an entity in June of I97o when it was incorporated as a
non-profit corporation under the laws of Delaware. For months before the in-
corporation, the concept had been in the development process at OEO. In the fall
of 1969, Donald Rumsfeld, then Administrator of the Office of Economic Oppor-
tunity, asked Ted Cross, who was later to become the author of the OFC concept,
to come to Washington to develop a program based on his book, Black Capitalism.0
Cross, a New York City attorney and an expert on banking law, decided to under-
a d.
'See OFF=CE OF EcoNoaIc OPPORTUNITY, TH OPPoRUNrTY FUNDING CORPoitAioN STATmMNT OF
Wo x (1970). This document was initially drafted by Theodore Cross and reworked by OEO officials,
and consists of a forty-three page description of the proposed OFC program. It does not state ex-
plicitly which projects OFC would undertake; rather it describes a variety of possible projects and gen-
erally describes the concepts underlying the OFC program.
5 Bowman, supra note 2.
6T. CRoss, BLAc. CArrnmsm (1969).
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take the project on a half-time basis as a consultant to OEO. He maintained his
law practice and other business interests in New York City on a restricted basis
for the duration of his work in Washington. He was supplied with three secretaries,
an aide who was a White House Fellow and several offices at OEO headquarters.
He spent the next six months working with a few Rumsfeld aides in designing a
program that would pass bureaucratic inspection. He also talked with scores of
business and financial leaders, minority businessmen, government officials, and
academicians. The result was OFC.
Cross argued that there will never be enough money available to fund minority
economic development programs from government sources alone and that ways
and means must be found to substantially leverage the resources from standard
money markets. He further argued that only by inducing such substantial private
sector investment of resources and expertise can sufficient effort be brought to bear on
the problem. The rationale for these arguments had been developed earlier while
he was writing his book on black capitalism.
The major thesis of the Cross book is that the ghetto economy does not obey
the rules of the larger economy. Cross argues that credit, at a reasonable cost, is
unavailable in the ghetto, that savings as a source of equity capital are almost non-
existent, and that the ghetto entrepreneur is a "missing person." Many of the
incentives which would promote business and economic development are missing.
The full magnitude of the problem must first be understood before any action can be
taken to remedy the situation. Cross states that viewing the ghetto as merely a
reflection of the larger society has, in the past, only provided palliatives as a solu-
tion and that such palliatives have had no long-term impact on getting at the root
cause of ghetto poverty.7
Cross maintains that fifteen million or more black people live in 163 isolated
slums whose economics are fundamentally structured to prevent the accumulation
of wealth because they:
(i) are inhospitable to investment or technical assistance;
(2) have little motivation to save or convert even available savings to venture
capital;
(3) have little or no entrepreneurial opportunity in legitimate business; and
(4) are isolated from the mainstream economy by a series of tariffs on retail
sales, rents, and credit, but are totally dependent on imports from the main-
stream economy for most of their basic goods and services.8
Cross feels that the economic system of the ghetto economy militates against
traditional programs of poverty aid or charity as a vehicle for change. He also
concludes that the federal government has been unable to demonstrate competence
7ld. at 21-69.
'1d. at 204-05; but see J. DursaesEaaRy, INcomE_, SAvING, AND THE THEoRy oF CoNsUMER Bm.-AVioR
50-52 (1949) for a quite different view of the motivation for savings and investment. See also pp.
17-68 for a general theoretical discussion.
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in implementing effective anti-poverty programs.9 Thus he advocates a system of
federal incentives, guarantees, equity insurance, rediscount arrangements, and sub-
sidies which will induce a massive infusion of private sector capital and know-how
into the ghettos to create viable capital creation and retention institutions. This new
system of incentives, guarantees, and subsidies must be structured to provide a
compelling reason for private investment, not one based primarily on charity or
guilt feelings.
B. Formation of OFC
The early OFC developmental work at OEO was dubbed "Project X." Project
X went through a number of written drafts which were carefully circulated to a
select group within the agency. Circulation was limited to less than ten copies of
the document. The document consisted of a hypothetical press conference by Rums-
feld explaining the nature and purpose of OFC, a functional description of the
OFC organization, and a series of possible experimental projects. Many of these
experimental projects were added by Mr. Cross after discussions with a number
of businessmen, financiers, community leaders, academicians, and governmental
officials.
It was decided that OFO would take the form of a non-profit corporation whose
funding would come largely from title I-D Special Impact Funds."° It was felt that
OFC should be relatively independent of the government in order to have more
freedom to experiment. To help insure this independence a highly prestigious board
of directors was assembled:
Dr. David Hertz, Chairman Rev. Leon Sullivan
(elected October, 1970) President and Founder
Director, McKinsey & Co. Opportunities Industrialization Center
New York, New York Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Eli Goldston Dr. Robert Vowels
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Dean, School of Business Administration
Eastern Gas & Fuel Association Atlanta University
Boston, Massachusetts Atlanta, Georgia
Alex Mercure Robert 0. Dehlendorf, II
State Project Director, Project HELP President, Arcata National Corporation
Albuquerque, New Mexico Menlo Park, California
' In his The Age of Discontinuity, Peter Drucker has generally concluded that federal government
programs in such social areas as poverty and education have largely failed because government is not
equipped to implement or carry out programs. Thus Drucker, like Cross, advocates a restructuring
of federal programs to require the government to provide the overall strategy and financial incentives,
while the implementation is left to the private sector. P. Davucer, ThE Aoa oll DlscorxuInT 212-42
(1968).
"oSee description detailed in note 12 infra.
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John Mabie Dan Lufkin
Vice-President and Director Chairman, Executive Committee
A. G. Becker and Company Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette
Chicago, Illinois New York, New York
James M. Hall
Secretary, Business and Transportation
Agency
State of California
Sacramento, California
The board is divided fairly evenly between Republicans and Democrats. It
contains three minority group members and is headed by David Hertz. Names of
board members were solicited from a variety of sources, both inside and outside
of government. The major criteria, aside from political considerations, were a history
of active participation in minority economic development, clout in the corporate
world or in minority communities, and a willingness to devote substantial amounts
of personal time to OFC. Every candidate was cleared through the White House,
and several potential candidates were dropped because they were unacceptable to
the White House. However, the White House was liberal in its view of candidates'
political orientation and four of the first five appointments were Democrats.
It was decided that most of the programs would be channeled through the
OEO-initiated and supported community development corporations (ODO's). This
decision was made, in part, to mute pressures exerted by the CDC's against the
establishment of OFC. Community development corporations draw their principal
support from tide I-D funding and were not pleased at the prospect of competing
with OFC for limited funds."
Little thought was given to possible alternatives or supplementary sources for
OFC funding from other government agencies. It was assumed that most of the
funding for the forseeable future would come from OEO title I-D research and
demonstration appropriations and from public offerings of OFC securities, "Oppor-
tunity Bonds." Cross contemplated that OFC would acquire significant independence
and power if it could market Opportunity Bonds in public markets. Initial funding
of OFC was pegged at about $20 million, but only $7.4 million actually was made
available.' Approximately one half came from title I-D funds and half from research
" Approximately $io.6 million was available in fiscal 1969 and $31.2 million in fiscal 1970 from
title I-D. Fifteen existing CDC's and 21 new CDC's received title I-D funds in fiscal 1970. Thus, less
than an average of Si million was available per CDC in fiscal 197o. DEPARTMENT OF COIsssaRcE, REPORT
TO THE PRESIDENT ON MfINoRTY BusINEss ENrRIssE, at III-32 to IH-33 (1970).
" An OEO news release (June 30, 1970) indicated that the newly created non-profit OFC was
incorporated in Delaware and would have its principal offices in Washington, D.C. Its initial funding
of $7.4 million would come from title I-D ($3.9 million) and from research and development funds
($3.5 million). "Title I-D" refers to the section in the OEO Act of 1964 which provides development
funds for "special impact areas." What the news release did not say is that OFC was originally to
have received more than $20 million in first year funds. But internal pressures at OEO and pressures
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and demonstration funds.'
In addition to the board of directors, the corporation was to have a president
and a small professional staff, perhaps three to five in number most of whom were
minority group members. 4 Although OFC was incorporated in June, 1969, little
was done to find a president until the fall of i97o when David Hertz engaged a
private consulting firm to assemble a list of potential candidates. By October, the
list had been reduced to eight candidates, each of whom was to be interviewed by
members of the board. In late November, the decision was made to name John
Gloster of the Urban Coalition as the first president of the OFC.
Mr. John Gloster presented his initial plan to the board in December, and three
of the OFC pilot projects are currently underway: (i) surety bonding for minority
contractors in cooperation with black and Chicano contractors in Los Angeles, and
with black contractors seeking a substantial part of the Metro transit program
in the District of Columbia; (2) consumer credit for low-income citizens, including
those on welfare and those unemployed, in cooperation with the National Congress
for Community Economic Development and community development corporations
and their constituents; and, (3) supplementary funding for low-income area minority
lending institutions m
II
OPRA TioN oF OFC
A. Components of the Opportunity Funding Corporation
OFC has three principal components: Opportunity Guarantee, Community De-
velopment Discount, and Incentive Simulation (figure I). The first component,
Opportunity Guarantee, is designed to reduce the aversion of private institutions
to committing capital and credit to low-income communities by providing a variety
of guarantees. It will operate only when comparable guarantees are not available
from existing federal, state, or private sources and where the perceived risk is quite
high. The second component, Community Development Discount, is designed to
demonstrate the feasibility of establishing a secondary market for SBA- and EDA-
backed obligations and other commercial paper generated in low-income com-
munities. It will purchase this paper, repackage it, and resell these new securities
with a guarantee to such institutions as pension funds, churches, and others seeking
a safe, yet socially useful investment opportunity. This guarantee will be similar
to that of the Federal National Mortgage Company in the mortgage market. It
from the community development corporations led to the cutback of almost two-thirds of the original
pledge amount.
"Initially, when the funding was to have been more than $20 million, it was thought that the
staff might have to be considerably larger than the presently planned four or five professionals. One of the
authors had been asked to design an organization structure for this larger organization.
"PRoTs, Jan., 1971, at 3 (monthly newsletter of the Institute for Minority Business Enterprise,
Howard University).
is id.
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is designed to test whether such a facility can provide substantially increased liquidity
for lending institutions serving low-income communities.
In briefings Cross always emphasized that the great gamble of OFC was that
development in ghettos, barrios, and reservations could ultimately become self-
financing. He argued that historically bankers have always been wrong-that the non-
bankable goals of today always become the solid collateral of tomorrow. He urged the
analogy of the World Bank which is currently making development loans to fund
housing and health care for the poor of East Pakistan and other underdeveloped
nations.
The third component, Incentive Simulation, is intended to test various incentives,
such as simulated tax incentives, to promote private investment in disadvantaged
communities. Of course, OFC is not organized with these three distinct elements,
and one staff member may be responsible for projects in several component areas.
FIGURE I
OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
I
GRANT
Opportunity Funding Corporation
(A private non-profit corporation)
Opportunity Guaranty Community Incentive Simulator
Component (OGC) Development Discount Component (ISC)
I Component (CD2)
Source: OEO, OPPoR=tNTY FuNDING: AN EcoNo-AIC DEvELOPMENT DEMONSrRATION PROGRAM (1970).
B. OFC-A Demonstration Vehicle
It is important to understand OFC as one of the very few minority economic
development programs which has the full support of the Nixon Administration. On
several occasions Cross presented the OFC program to the White House staff and, in
March, 1970, to President Nixon and the full Cabinet. OFC seeks to apply the
traditional techniques of financial leveraging to minority economic development. It
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is not a welfare program; it is not meant to provide outright grants; rather it seeks
to use modest sums of government money to attract large sums of private capital into
the nation's rural and urban ghettos and barrios.
OFC is not truly an operating arm of the federal government, rather it is a test
and demonstration vehicle like its parent organization, OEO. Its stated purpose
"is to test the effectiveness of various incentive techniques in attracting private
sources of money to rural and urban low-income areas." Each of the pilot projects
is designed to establish a specific need for legislative and/or administrative changes.
Thus the OFC has chosen four criteria for the selection of projects for funding:
i. The project must be innovative in concept and must provide leverage for
OFC's investment.
2. The project must have national impact, as distinguished from meeting a local
economic need under specialized circumstances.
3. The project must be capable of being reproduced in other localities.
4. The project must have demonstrable benefits for poverty area residents."
III
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS
Ted Cross is a consummate technician. He knows the art of finance and the
related areas of law, but he was unaware of the intricacies of governmental agencies
or community development politics. He also was unaware of the need to cultivate
various members of the OEO bureaucracy as well as community development leaders
who would be most affected by OFC. Donald Rumsfeld, Cross' leading backer,
assumed that OFC could be conceived and set into motion with only minimal
interface with community leaders or with OEO's own internal departments. Rums-
feld did check out the OFC concept with a number of influential persons such as
McGeorge Bundy, President of the Ford Foundation. However, the failure to fully
inform those most directly affected by OFC, such as the CDC's and other community
development groups, has resulted in substantial criticism both inside and outside
OEO, often more because of ignorance of the proposed program rather than genuine
criticism of its substance. In private, most community leaders are enthusiastic about
the OFC concept and few OEO staff members can be found to argue against the
substance of the FC program.
The original framework for restructuring ghetto economies presented by Cross
in Black Capitalism assumed a massive simultaneous onslaught on many fronts
such as designing programs to reduce the risk on "soft" commercial loans, developing
a secondary market for ghetto installment paper, stimulating deposits in slum area
banks, establishing special ghetto development banks, increasing the amount of
capital available for ghetto ventures, and planning other programs to develop and
:to Id.
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train ghetto entrepreneurs.7 Although not explicitly articulated, it is apparent
that Cross assumed that the synergy developed by these various complementary pro-
grams would provide a critical mass for significant change. While economists are
not entirely clear about all the prerequisites for economic development in under-
developed areas, it is fairly clear that such development requires the interaction of
many individual components to achieve significant growth.
OFC, on the other hand, proposes to initiate at most one or two experiments
in any one ghetto area. Thus, these experiments are not likely to be more than a
pale shadow of the real capital base-building and leveraging -techniques commonly
used in the larger economy, which depend for their success on the existence and
interaction of a whole series of financial and business institutions. OFC has very
limited resources, only $74 million for the first year of operation, which would not
even provide the capital for one medium-sized development bank. OFC will have
to concentrate on a limited number of projects in a relatively small number of
poverty areas and thus will not be able to really simulate an overall economic
development program in any community.
There is the very critical question of measurement of results. What can be
measured and over what period of time? Donald Rumsfeld in the hypothetical
Project X press conference says, "The guaranty and loan discount arrangements
should prove out quite quickly. In six months we'll know if inner city CDC's and
others are using our new facilities. It will probably be another year before we will
know about our costs, which are overhead plus bad debt experience. The tax sim-
ulations will take longer. We should know a lot in a year." ' Given the com-
plexity of the development process generally, along with the additional problems of
operating in a ghetto environment, it would seem that Rumsfeld's optimism is
scarcely justified. Mere use by CDC's or other community groups is hardly proof
of the relative success of OFC experiments. These groups may use OFC simply
because it represents an additional source of funding, not because they foresee any
long-term economic benefit to themselves or to the community. Nor is it clear that
measurement of usage is any indication of the capital base building potential of any
particular item in the OFC repertoire.
Another important problem is the fact that the OFC may be continually in the
spotlight, subject to political pressures from a variety of sources. These pressures
are likely to require that OFC produce immediate, visible successes. The initial
projects must be successful, at least in terms of what can be easily measured, such
as the number of users of OFC services or the number of dollars attracted into
a particular project. Such measures, however, may not indicate the eventual im-
portance of OFC experiments.19 Economic development is a long-term process
"IT. Caoss, supra note 6, at 159-209.
18 T. Cross, Project X, Mar. io, 197 o , at 9-1o (unpublished 0EO memorandum).
" For a discussion of the difficulties of measuring the results of CDC programs, see M. Brower, The
Criteria for Measuring the Success of a Community Development Corporation in the Ghetto, Mar., 197o
(unpublished paper in Cambridge Institute).
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and as such is not likely to yield much in the way of early success stories. In fact,
it may be necesary to sacrifice early numerical usage figures for long-term impact.20
OFC is at present in direct competition for funds with the various CDC's.
This has already created substantial hostility to the concept of OFC. Thus OFC
must prove, fairly rapidly, that it does in fact make it possible to leverage CDC
funding, or else it will come under increasing attack from the CDC's.
Another substantial problem area is that of transferring the results of "successful
experiments" to operating agencies. No one at OEO considered in detail the
problems entailed in transferring the results of OFC experiments to the various
domestic affairs agencies involved in development, such as the Small Business Ad-
ministration, the Department of Agriculture, and the Economic Development
Administration in the Department of Commerce. Cross did give briefings to a
number of agencies and departments, but no real study has been made of the transfer
problem. Of course, in those cases requiring legislation, the appropriate con-
gressional committee must be involved early in the experimental process. There is
substantial literature available in the information transfer area, most of which in-
dicates the complexity of transferring information across institutional lines.21
Continued funding is likely to be a problem, given the general congressional
and Administration disposition to cut back on OEO funding. There also will be
problems clearing new funding through OEO itself, as OFC fund proposals must
compete with numerous other applicants for very scarce economic development funds.
In addition, there is a built-in tension between the desire of OEO to control
OFC experiments to maximize their value in terms of OEO goals and objectives
and the desire of OFO to operate as an independent entity free to choose experiments
from its own agenda. In the initial contract negotiations between OEO and OFC,
there was a considerable amount of friction over the degree to which OEO would
control experiments. Several board members indicated their unhappiness with what
they saw as OEO's attempt to maintain a veto power over OFC operations. This
issue was vigorously debated over a period of several weeks before the initial
contract was signed, and it is still in doubt. OEO has historically been cited by
a number of grantee institutions as unduly officious in the conduct of funded re-
search.22 On the other hand, OFC does represent the principal vehicle for domestic
development experimentation and is therefore of great importance to the success
"°A similar problem was presented for NASA in its spinoff program with its need to produce
quickly tangible examples of technology transfer. This emphasis on producing quick success in a very
complex problem area may have been the single most important reason for the failure of the NASA
transfer program. For a discussion of this similar measurement problem area, see S. DoCros, Tim ROLE
oF T FEDERAL AGENcrEs IN TECwNOLOGY TRAwsFE (1969).
2 See, e.g., E. RooGERs, DiFFusIoN OF INNoVATION (1962); S. DocToRs, supra note 20; J. JEwscs,
D. SAWERS, & R. STILLE.R u, THm SouRcas OF INVENTION (1958).
2 The issue of unduly restrictive federal agency contract terms and administration is discussed in
STAFF OF REsEARCH Am TEcNIc.AL PROBLEMS SuBcomm. OF THE HousE Coms . ON GOV'T OPERATIONS,
90TH CONG., isr SESs., REPORT ON THE UsE OF SociAL REsEARCH IN FEDERAL DomESTIc PROORAms,
pt. 4, at 486-658 (Comm. Print 1967). This report indicates that OEO was the agency most often
cited by grantees for its "interference" in their research and development work.
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of many present and future OEO programs. Thus, there will be a continuing need
to balance the goals of the two organizations to ensure maximum flexibility to
experiment for OFC while still maintaining a reasonable amount of direction and
control over these experiments, thereby ensuring effective feedback for other OEO
programs and for transfer to various operating agencies.
IV
PREREQuisiTEs FOR SUCCESSFUL OFC OPERATION
For successful OFC operation, the organization must establish its long-term goals
and must effectively communicate them to its various constituents. If it is to be
a truly experimental agency in economic development, then it must seek to educate
the various constituencies to this long-term orientation. These various constituencies
include the CDC's, the various congressional committees, OEO, domestic affairs
agencies (such as SBA, HUD, and EDA), and the investment community. OFC must
avoid becoming just another operating arm of OEO or of any other agency. It must
design its projects for long-term impact and work to identify appropriate methods
of evaluation which will probably include social as well as economic measures of
success. To minimize political pressures, several steps must be taken, such as seeking
funds from sources outside OEO, both public and private; selecting a portion of the
initial projects for their early, visible impact on the community; seeking to participate
in the selection and evaluation criteria; and channeling most of the early projects
through the CDC's.
It is likely that the results of the OFC program will be a mixed bag for the
immediate future. Nevertheless, it remains the one truly experimental program
available to the Administration to test a variety of capital base-building devices. It
has a strong board of directors and an able president, and it can operate in a
relatively independent manner. To achieve its goals OFC will have to secure
sufficient funds from a variety of sources, obtain substantial community support,
devise meaningful measures of the various projects undertaken, and find ways
and means of transferring its results to operating agencies.
